Abstract. We study the problem of improving the greedy constant or the democracy constant of a basis of a Banach space by renorming. We prove that every Banach space with a greedy basis can be renormed, for a given ε > 0, so that the basis becomes (1 + ε)-democratic, and hence (2 + ε)-greedy, with respect to the new norm. If in addition the basis is bidemocratic, then there is a renorming so that in the new norm the basis is (1 + ε)-greedy. We also prove that in the latter result the additional assumption of the basis being bidemocratic can be removed for a large class of bases. Applications include the Haar systems in Lp[0, 1], 1 < p < ∞, and in dyadic Hardy space H 1 , as well as the unit vector basis of Tsirelson space.
Introduction
In approximation theory one is often faced with the following problem. We start with a signal, i.e., a vector x in some Banach space X. We then consider the (unique) expansion
x i e i of x with respect to some (Schauder) basis (e i ) of X. For example, this may be a Fourier expansion of x, or it may be a wavelet expansion in L p . We then wish to approximate x by considering m-term approximations with respect to the basis. The smallest error is given by σ m (x) = inf x − i∈A a i e i : A ⊂ N, |A| ≤ m, (a i ) i∈A ⊂ R .
We are interested in algorithms that are easy to implement and that produce the best m-term approximation, or at least get close to it. A very natural process is the greedy algorithm which we now describe. For each x = x i e i ∈ X we fix a permutation ρ = ρ x of N (not necessarily unique) such that |x ρ(1) | ≥ |x ρ(2) | ≥ . . . . We then define the m th greedy approximant to x by
x ρ(i) e ρ(i) .
For this to make sense we need inf e i > 0, otherwise (x i ) may be unbounded.
In fact, since we will be dealing with democratic bases, all our bases will be seminormalized, which means that 0 < inf e i ≤ sup e i < ∞. It follows that the biorthogonal functionals (e We measure the efficiency of the greedy algorithm by comparing it to the best m-term approximation. We say that (e i ) is a greedy basis for X if there exists C > 0 (C-greedy) such that
for all x ∈ X and for all m ∈ N .
The smallest C is the greedy constant of the basis. Note that being a greedy basis is a strong property. It implies in particular the strictly weaker property that G m (x) converges to x for all x ∈ X. If this weaker property holds, then we say that the basis (e i ) is quasi-greedy. This is still a non-trivial property: a Schauder basis need not be quasi-greedy in general.
The simplest examples of greedy bases include the unit vector basis of ℓ p (1 ≤ p < ∞) or c 0 , or orthonormal bases of a separable Hilbert space. An important and non-trivial example is the Haar basis of L p [0, 1] (1 < p < ∞) which was shown to be greedy by V. N. Temlyakov [7] . This result was later established by P. Wojtaszczyk [8] using a different method which extended to the Haar system in one-dimensional dyadic Hardy space H p (R), 0 < p ≤ 1. We also mention two recent results. S. J. Dilworth, D. Freeman, E. Odell and Th. Schlumprecht [3] proved that ⊕ ∞ n=1 ℓ n p ℓq has a greedy basis whenever 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ and 1 < q < ∞. Answering a question raised in [3] , G. Schechtman showed that none of the space ∞ n=1 ℓ p ℓq , 1 ≤ p = q < ∞, ∞ n=1 ℓ p c0 , 1 ≤ p < ∞, and ∞ n=1 c 0 ℓq , 1 ≤ q < ∞, have greedy bases.
Greedy bases are closely related to unconditional bases. We recall that a basis (e i ) of a Banach space X is said to be unconditional if there is a constant K (K-unconditional ) such that a i e i ≤ K · b i e i whenever |a i | ≤ |b i | for all i ∈ N .
The best constant K is the unconditional constant of the basis which we denote by K U . The property of being unconditional is easily seen to be equivalent to that of being suppression unconditional which means that for some constant K (suppression K-unconditional ) the natural projection onto any subsequence of the basis has norm at most K:
a i e i for all (a i ) ⊂ R, A ⊂ N .
The smallest K is the suppression unconditional constant of the basis and is denoted by K S . It is easy to verify that K S ≤ K U ≤ 2K S . Note that it is trivial to renorm the space X so that in the new norm the basis is suppression 1-unconditional. Indeed, for A ⊂ N the map P A : X → X, defined by P A i∈N x i e i = i∈A x i e i , is bounded in norm by K S . Hence |||x||| = sup{ P A (x) : A ⊂ N} is a K S -equivalent norm on X in which (e i ) is suppression 1-unconditional. Similarly, using maps M λ : X → X given by x i e i → λ i x i e i , where λ = (λ i ) ∈ B ℓ∞ , we can define a K U -equivalent norm on X in which (e i ) is 1-unconditional.
In [6] , S. V. Konyagin and V. N. Temlyakov introduced the notion of greedy and democratic bases and proved the following characterization.
Theorem 1 ([6, Theorem 1]). A basis of a Banach space is greedy if and only if it is unconditional and democratic.
A basis (e i ) is said to be democratic if there is a constant ∆ ≥ 1 (∆-democratic) such that i∈A e i ≤ ∆ i∈B e i whenever |A| ≤ |B| .
By carefully following the proof of [9, Theorem 1], one obtains the following estimates:
One can in fact get slightly better estimates by amalgamating some of the steps in that proof:
That is, a C-greedy basis is suppression C-unconditional and C-democratic, and conversely, an unconditional and ∆-democratic basis is C-greedy with C ≤ K S + K 2 U · ∆. In particular a 1-unconditional, 1-democratic basis is 2-greedy. By [5, Theorem 3 .1] the constant 2 is best possible. Thus, improving the democracy constant by renorming will not in general improve the greedy constant beyond 2.
In this paper we are concerned with the problem whether a Banach space X with a greedy basis (e i ) can be renormed so that in the new norm the greedy constant of the basis (e i ) is improved ideally to 1 or at least to 1 + ε where ε > 0 can be chosen arbitrarily small. As a byproduct, we also obtain results on renormings that improve the democracy constant. The maps P A and M λ that were used above in renormings that improve the unconditional constants are linear. By contrast, the functions G m that map vectors to their greedy approximants are not linear, and that is what makes the problem of improving the greedy constant far from trivial.
In the rest of this section we recall what is already known about this problem and state our new results. Definitions will be given in later sections when needed.
In [1] F. Albiac and P. Wojtaszczyk gave a characterization of 1-greedy bases in terms of a weak symmetry property of the basis. They raised several open problems about symmetry properties of 1-greedy bases and about the possibility of improving greedy and democratic constants by renorming. Most of the problems were answered by four of the authors of this paper in [5] . In Section 2 we recall the Albiac-Wojtaszczyk characterization, and a theorem from [5] which shows that a space with an unconditional, bidemocratic basis can be renormed to make the basis 1-unconditional and 1-bidemocratic. By (1) above, such a basis is 2-greedy. Here we will obtain the following stronger result.
Theorem A. Let X be a Banach space with an unconditional, bidemocratic basis (e i ). Then for all ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-unconditional, 1-bidemocratic and (1 + ε)-greedy.
In particular, the above result applies to the Haar basis of L p [0, 1] for 1 < p < ∞. In Section 4 is concerned with the general case, i.e., when we do not assume bidemocracy. In [1] Albiac and Wojtaszczyk asked whether the democracy constant can be improved to 1. It was already shown in [5] that the answer in general is 'no': the Haar system of dyadic H 1 , or an arbitrary unconditional basis of Tsirelson's space T cannot be made 1-democratic by renorming. Here we are able to prove the following positive result.
Theorem B. Let (e i ) be an unconditional and democratic basis of a Banach space X. For any ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is normalized, 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-democratic.
This answers a question raised by W. B. Johnson. By equation (1) , it follows from this theorem that if (e i ) is a greedy basis of a Banach space X, then for all ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-unconditional and (2 + ε)-greedy. The following problem remains open in its full generality.
Problem C. Let X be a Banach space with a greedy basis (e i ). Given ε > 0, does there exist an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-greedy?
In the last section we will give a positive answer for a large class of bases. As an application we obtain, for any ε > 0, a renorming of Hardy space H 1 and of Tsirelson's space T such that the Haar system, respectively, unit vector basis is (1 + ε)-greedy.
Bidemocratic bases
The aim of this section is to prove Theorem A. We first recall the AlbiacWojtaszczyk characterization of 1-greedy bases [1] . In fact a trivial modification of their proof gives a characterization of C-greedy bases for an arbitrary C ≥ 1. For the sake of completeness we shall state and prove their result here in that more general form.
Let (e i ) be a basis of a Banach space X with biorthogonal sequence (e * i ). For a finite set A ⊂ N we denote by 1 A the vector i∈A e i of X or sometimes the vector i∈A e * i in X * . It will be clear from the context which one is meant. For example the notation 1 A means the norm of i∈A e i in X, whereas 1 A * indicates the norm in the dual space of i∈A e * i . The support with respect to the basis (e i ) of a vector x =
x i e i in X is the set supp(x) = {i ∈ N : x i = 0}. The subspace of vectors with finite support, i.e., the linear span of (e i ), can be indentified in the obvious way with the space c 00 of real sequences that are eventually zero. The basis (e i ) then corresponds to the unit vector basis of c 00 . Given vectors x = x i e i and y = y i e i in c 00 , we say y is a greedy rearrangement of x if there exist w, u = (u i ), t = (t j ) ∈ c 00 of pairwise disjoint support such that x = w+u, y = w+t, |supp(u)| = |supp(t)|, and w ℓ∞ ≤ |u i | = |t j | for all i ∈ supp(u), j ∈ supp(t). To put it informally, y is obtained from x by moving (and possibly changing the sign of) some of the coefficients of x of maximum modulus to co-ordinates where x is zero. Given C ≥ 1, we say that (e i ) has Property (A) with constant C if for all x, y ∈ c 00 we have y ≤ C x whenever y is a greedy rearrangement of x.
Theorem 2 (cf. [1, Theorem 3.4] ). Let (e i ) be a basis of a Banach space X. If (e i ) is C-greedy, then it is suppression C-unconditional and has Property (A) with constant C. Conversely, if (e i ) is suppression K-unconditional and has Property (A) with constant C, then it is greedy with constant at most K 2 C. In particular, a suppression 1-unconditional basis of a Banach space is C-greedy if and only if it satisfies Property (A) with constant C.
Proof. First assume that (e i ) is C-greedy. We show that if x =
x i e i ∈ X has finite support and A ⊂ N, then i∈A x i e i ≤ C x . Let B = supp(x) \ A and m = |B|. Choose a real number λ > x ℓ∞ , and set z = i∈A x i e i + λ1 B . Then G m (z) = λ1 B and w = i∈B (λ − x i )e i is an m-term approximation to z. It follows that i∈A
as required. We next show that (e i ) has Property (A) with constant C. Let y = w+t be a greedy rearrangement of x = w + u, where w, u, t ∈ c 00 are as in the definition above. Fix δ > 0 and set z = w + (1 + δ)u + t. Let m = |supp(u)| = |supp(t)|. Then G m (z) = (1 + δ)u, whereas t is another m-term approximation to z. It follows that
Letting δ → 0 yields y ≤ C x , as required.
To prove the converse, fix x = x i e i ∈ c 00 and m ∈ N. Let i∈A x i e i be the m th greedy approximant to x, and let b = i∈B b i e i be an arbitrary m-term approximation. Let s = min{|x i | : i ∈ A}, and for each i ∈ N let ε i be the sign of
We use this in the first and third inequalities below, whereas the second inequality uses Property (A).
This completes the proof.
Remark. Let (e i ) be a 1-unconditional basis of a Banach space X. For x ∈ c 00 define · x to be the function
which defines a norm on span{e i : i ∈ N \ supp(x)}. Theorem 2 implies that (e i ) is C-greedy if and only if for every x ∈ c 00 with x ℓ∞ ≤ 1 the norm · x is Cdemocratic. This characterization of greedy bases is slightly different from the one given by Konyagin and Temlyakov [6] where they only assume the democracy of · x for x = 0. However, for our purposes, the above result has the advantage that the greedy constant is the same as the Property (A) constant.
We next recall the notion of bidemocracy, which was introduced by S. J. Dilworth, N. J. Kalton, Denka Kutzarova and V. N. Temlyakov in [4] , and the corresponding renorming result [5, Theorem 2.1]. Suppose that (e i ) is a seminormalized basis of a Banach space X with biorthogonal sequence (e * i ). The fundamental function ϕ of (e i ) is defined by
The dual fundamental function ϕ * is given by
We recall that (ϕ(n)/n) is a decreasing function of n, since for any A ⊂ N with |A| = n ≥ 2 we have
It is known [4, Proposition 4.2] that if (e i ) is bidemocratic with constant ∆, then both (e i ) and (e * i ) are democratic with constant ∆. In [5] the following result was proved.
Theorem 3. Suppose that (e i ) is a 1-unconditional and ∆-bidemocratic basis for a Banach space X. Then
is an equivalent norm on X. Moreover, (e i ) is 1-unconditional and 1-bidemocratic with respect to |||·|||. In particular, (e i ) and (e * i ) are 1-democratic and 2-greedy. By [5, Theorem 3.1], the conclusion that (e i ) is 2-greedy whenever it is 1-unconditional and 1-democratic cannot be strengthened in general. We now prove a stronger theorem which is the main result of this section. First we introduce two pieces of notation. For a vector x =
x i e i we write |x| for |x i |e i , and x ≥ 0 if
Theorem 4. Let X be a Banach space with an unconditional, bidemocratic basis (e i ). Then for all ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-unconditional, 1-bidemocratic and (1 + ε)-greedy.
Proof. After renorming, we may assume that (e i ) is normalized, 1-unconditional and 1-bidemocratic. Let ϕ and ϕ * denote the fundamental and, respectively, dual fundamental function of (e i ). Fix ε ∈ (0, 1). Define a new norm |||·||| on X as follows.
It is clear that (e i ) is a 1-unconditional basis in |||·|||. We next prove that it also satisfies Property (A) with constant 1 + ε. Fix x ∈ c 00 and B,B ⊂ N \ supp(x) such that x ℓ∞ ≤ 1 and |B| = |B| < ∞. It will be sufficient to prove that |||x + 1 B ||| ≤ (1 + ε)|||x + 1B|||. We may of course assume that x ≥ 0. Let n ∈ N, A ⊂ N and x * ∈ εB X * be such that |A| = n and
Without loss of generality we may assume that supp(x * ) ∪ A ⊂ supp(x) ∪ B, and hence x * ≥ 0. Note that
Now chooseÃ ⊂ N such thatÃ ∩ supp(x) = A ∩ supp(x) and |B ∩Ã| = |B ∩ A|. Then |Ã| = n and (5) x, 1 A + |B ∩ A| = x, 1Ã + |B ∩Ã| .
We now obtain (4) and (5)
as required. Thus, so far, we have that (e i ) is 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-greedy in |||·|||. It is also clear that |||e i ||| = 1 + ε for all i ∈ N. Let ψ and ψ * denote the fundamental and, respectively, dual fundamental function of (e i ) with respect to |||·|||. Let m, n ∈ N and A, B ⊂ N with |A| = m and |B| = n. By definition of |||·|||, in the dual space we have |||
. Also, for any x * ∈ εB X * we have
Hence ψ(n) ≤ (1 + ε)ϕ(n), and (e i ) is (1 + ε)-bidemocratic in |||·|||. So if we replace |||·||| with 1 1+ε |||·||| and apply Theorem 3, then we obtain a new norm (1 + ε)-equivalent to |||·|||, and with respect to which (e i ) is normalized, 1-unconditional, 1-bidemocratic and (1 + ε) 2 -greedy.
Let us now observe that our theorem applies to a large class of Banach spaces and bases. We say that a democratic basis (e i ) (or its fundamental function ϕ) has the upper regularity property (or URP for short) if there exists an integer r > 2 such that
This is easily seen to be equivalent to the existence of 0 < β < 1 and a constant C such that
This property was introduced in [4] where it was shown that a greedy basis of a Banach space with nontrivial type has the URP and that a greedy basis with the URP is bidemocratic. More precisely, they showed that if (e i ) is a greedy basis with fundamental function ϕ, and there exists a constant C such that
then (e i ) is bidemocratic. It is of course clear that the URP implies (6). It is well known that L p [0, 1] for 1 < p < ∞ has nontrivial type. Thus we obtain the following corollary. Remark. By the Albiac-Wojtaszczyk characterization, a 1-greedy basis is suppression 1-unconditional, and hence 2-unconditional. As shown in [5, Theorem 4.1], the unconditional constant 2 is in general the best one can say about a 1-greedy basis. This is why the 1-unconditionality was included in the above results.
The class of quasi-concave functions
We denote by R + the set of (strictly) positive real numbers. Recall that the fundamental function ϕ : N → R + of a basis of a Banach space is increasing and n →
The fundamental function of a basis of a Banach space is the restriction to N of a fundamental function in the above sense. Indeed, if ϕ : N → R + is the fundamental function of a basis, then we can extend it to a function on [1, ∞) by linear interpolation. A straightforward calculation shows that this extended function is a fundamental function in the above sense. The converse is also true, i.e., if ϕ : [1, ∞) → R + is a fundamental function, then its restriction to N is the fundamental function of a basis. This will be shown in Proposition 8 at the end of this section. Given a fundamental function ϕ : [1, ∞) → R + and a basis (e i ) of a Banach space, we say that ϕ is a fundamental function for (e i ) if the restriction of ϕ to N is the fundamental function of (e i ).
Remark. In the literature fundamental functions in the above sense are also known as quasi-concave functions. See for example [2, Definition 5.6 on page 69], where quasi-concave functions are defined on the interval [0, ∞) and are naturally associated with rearrangement-invariant spaces. Since we work with discrete lattices corresponding to unconditional bases which in general are not symmetric, for us it will be more convenient to work with the definition above instead.
We will now introduce a parameter δ which provides information on the growth of fundamental functions. After that we will show that the concave envelope of a fundamental function is also a fundamental function.
Let ϕ : [1, ∞) → R + be a fundamental function. It will sometimes be more convenient to work with the function λ :
x . Note that λ is decreasing and xλ(x) is increasing. For y ∈ [1, ∞) define
It follows from properties of λ that δ ϕ is decreasing and bounded above by 1. Hence
Let us now observe that the function δ ϕ and the parameter δ(ϕ) depend only on the values of ϕ on N. Fix m ∈ N. For any real x ∈ [1, ∞), putting n = ⌊x⌋ + 1, we have
It follows that for each y ∈ [1, ∞) we have
and hence we obtain
Thus we have
One consequence of all this is that if (e i ) is a basis of a Banach space, then the parameter δ(ϕ) is the same for any fundamental function ϕ for (e i ). Two fundamental functions ϕ and ψ are said to be equivalent if there exist positive real numbers a and b such that aϕ(x) ≤ ψ(x) ≤ bϕ(x) for all x ∈ [1, ∞). In this case we write ϕ ∼ ψ. Note that equivalence also only depends on the restrictions to N of ϕ and ψ. Indeed, if for some b > 0 we have ψ(n) ≤ bϕ(n) for all n ∈ N, then
for all x ∈ [1, ∞). So for a basis (e i ) of a Banach space with a fundamental function ϕ, the property of having δ(ϕ) > 0 is invariant under renormings. We now prove a result about fundamental functions with positive δ-parameter. This will be used in Theorem 11 in the next section. , and obtain fundamental functions
x , x ∈ [1, ∞). To prove our initial claim, choose n 0 ∈ N such that λ(m 2 x) > δλ(x) for all real x ≥ n 0 . We now define a new function µ : [1, ∞) → R + as follows. We set µ(x) = λ(x) for all real x ∈ [1, n 0 ] and for all integers x of the form x = m 2k n 0 , k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . We then extend the definition of µ by interpolation as follows. Given a real number x ∈ [n 0 , ∞), we fix an integer k ≥ 0 such that x ∈ [n, m 2 n], where n = m 2k n 0 . (Note that k is unique unless x ∈ {m 2j n 0 : j ∈ N}.) Then there is a unique θ ∈ [0, 1] such that x = n 1−θ (m 2 n) θ . We define
Note that for x = n and x = m 2 n this agrees with the previous definition of µ(x) = λ(x). It follows that µ(x) is well-defined, and in particular it does not depend on the choice of k when x ∈ {m 2j n 0 : j ∈ N}. We now prove the following properties for each integer k ≥ 0 with n = m 2k n 0 .
(i) µ(x) is decreasing and xµ(x) is increasing on [n, m 2 n].
We will then set ψ(x) = xµ(x) for each x ∈ [1, ∞). Since µ = λ, and hence ψ = ϕ, on the set [1, n 0 ] ∪ {m 2k n 0 : k ≥ 0}, property (i) implies that ψ is a fundamental function, which is equivalent to ϕ by (ii), and satisfies δ ψ (m) ≥ √ δ by (iii). This proves the initial claim, and hence the lemma.
To see (i) simply differentiate the functions
θ with respect to θ. Next, fix θ ∈ [0, 1] and set x = n 1−θ (m 2 n) θ . By the properties of λ, we have
and, since λ(m 2 n) ≥ δλ(n), we have
Hence (ii) follows. Finally, fix 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1. In order to verify (iii) we need to show that
We consider two cases. When 0
Then, since λ(m 2 n) ≥ δλ(n) and θ ′ − θ > 0, the left-hand side of (7) becomes
In the second case, when
Then the left-hand side of (7) becomes
as required.
We next prove that every fundamental function is equivalent to a concave one. This is standard (see for example [2, Proposition 5.10]), but we repeat the simple proof here as we need a further property concerning the δ parameter.
Lemma 7. Let ϕ be a fundamental function. Then there exists a concave fundamental function ψ such that ϕ(x) ≤ ψ(x) ≤ 2ϕ(x) for all x ∈ [1, ∞). Moreover, we have δ ψ (y) ≥ δ ϕ (y) for all y ∈ [1, ∞).
Proof. We let ψ : [1, ∞) → R + be the concave envelope of ϕ. Recall that this is the (pointwise) smallest concave function dominating ϕ, and is given by
where the supremum is taken over all convex combinations x = n i=1 t i x i of numbers x 1 , . . . , x n ∈ [1, ∞). Of course this concave envelope exists if and only if the above supremum is finite for every x. To verify that this is true in our case, note that either x i < x and ϕ(x i ) ≤ ϕ(x), or x i ≥ x and we have ϕ(
It follows that ψ exists, and ϕ(x) ≤ ψ(x) ≤ 2ϕ(x) for all x. We next show that ψ is a fundamental function. Let 1 ≤ x ≤ y, and let x = n i=1 t i x i be a convex combination of elements of [1, ∞). Then n i=1 t i (x i + y − x) = y, and hence
Taking supremum yields ψ(y) ≥ ψ(x), and so ψ is increasing. Next, consider a convex combination y =
After taking supremum, this implies
y , which completes the proof that ψ is a fundamental function.
To show the "moreover" part of the lemma, first observe that if ϕ is bounded, then lim x→∞ ϕ(x) exists, and hence δ ϕ (y) = 1 y for all y ∈ [1, ∞). Since in this case ψ is also bounded, we have δ ϕ (y) = δ ψ (y) = 1 y for all y. Assume now that ϕ is unbounded. Fix y ≥ 1. It will be enough to show that if 0 < δ < δ ϕ (y) and ε > 0, then δ ≤ (1 + ε)δ ψ (y). Choose w ∈ [1, ∞) such that ϕ(yx) ≥ δyϕ(x) for all x ≥ w. Since ϕ(x) tends to infinity, we can then choose z > w such that δy ε ϕ(w) < ϕ(z). We will show that if x ≥ z, then (1 + ε)ψ(yx) ≥ δyψ(x), which will complete the proof. Fix a convex combination x = n i=1 t i x i . By the definition of ψ, we have
Let I = i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : x i ≥ w . By the choice of z, we have
It follows from this and from the choice of w that
Since this holds for all convex combinations x = k i=1 t i x i , we obtain (1+ε)ψ(yx) ≥ δyψ(x), as required.
Our next result shows that every fundamental function arises from a basis in a Banach space.
+ be a fundamental function. Then there is a Banach space with a 1-unconditional basis (e i ) whose fundamental function is the restriction of ϕ to N.
Proof. Let F be a family of finite subsets of N. The only condition we impose on F that it should contain for every n ∈ N a set of size n. By scaling we may assume that ϕ(1) = 1. Define a norm · on the space c 00 of finite sequences as follows:
It is clear that (e i ) is a normalized, 1-unconditional basis of the completion X of c 00 , · . Now let m, n ∈ N, let A ∈ F with m = |A|, and let B ⊂ N with |B| = n.
It follows that i∈B e i ≤ ϕ(n). On the other hand, since A ∈ F , we have i∈A e i ≥ ϕ(m). Thus the fundamental function of (e i ) is indeed ϕ.
Remark. For a continuous version see [2, Proposition 5.8] , where they show that every quasi-concave function is the fundamental function of a rearrangement-invariant space. However, in our result the basis constructed clearly need not be symmetric, or indeed even democratic. If for some δ > 0 every finite E ⊂ N has a subset A ∈ F with |A| ≥ δ|E|, then (e i ) is 1 δ -democratic. If F is the set of all subsets of N, then (e i ) is bidemocratic.
It is also possible for (e i ) to be democratic but not bidemocratic. For this to happen ϕ cannot be arbitrary. For example, if ϕ has the URP and (e i ) is democratic, then (e i ) is automatically bidemocratic [4, Proposition 4.4] . However, if ϕ(n) = n, say, and F is the family S of Schreier sets, i.e., sets A ⊂ N with |A| ≤ min A, then the dual fundamental function cannot be bounded otherwise X * would be isomorphic to c 0 , and hence X would be isomorphic to ℓ 1 .
We will later prove a renorming result for bases with fundamental function ϕ satisfying δ(ϕ) > 0. We conclude this section by observing that there are bases with δ(ϕ) = 0. Fix integers 1 = n 1 < n 2 < . . . . Define ϕ : N → R + by setting ϕ(1) = 1 and keeping ϕ(n) n constant on intervals [n k , n k+1 ] when k is odd, and keeping ϕ constant on intervals [n k , n k+1 ] when k is even. Extend ϕ to a fundamental function defined on [1, ∞) . If the n k are sufficiently rapidly increasing, then δ ϕ (m) = 0 for all m ∈ N. By Proposition 8 this ϕ is a fundamental function for some Schauder basis.
The general case
In this section we will prove Theorem B and give a positive answer to Problem C in the case the fundamental function ϕ has δ(ϕ) > 0. We will require the following crucial lemma.
Lemma 9.
Let (e i ) be a normalized, 1-unconditional, ∆-democratic basis of a Banach space X with fundamental function ϕ. Given 0 < q < 1, fix C > ∆ q (1−q) and set A = A ⊂ N : A finite and
Then for every finite E ⊂ N there exists A ∈ A such that A ⊂ E and |A| ≥ q|E|.
Proof. Choose δ > 0 such that C > (1+δ)∆ δq(1−q) . Let n ∈ N and E ⊂ N with |E| = n. We inductively construct z (1) , z (2) , . . . in B X * and pairwise disjoint subsets E 1 , E 2 , . . . of E as follows. Assume that for some k ∈ N we have already defined
and define
≥ δ} . This completes the induction step. We will see in a moment that this process terminates after a finite number of steps. Assume that E 1 , . . . , E m and F 1 , . . . , F m+1 have been defined for some m ≥ 1 (note that |F 1 | = |E| > (1 − q)n, so at least one set E 1 is defined). For each k = 1, . . . , m and for each i ∈ E k we have
and hence z
It follows that
On the other hand, since |F k | ≥ (1 − q)n for each k = 1, . . . , m, and since ϕ(x)/x is decreasing, we have
Thus, we can deduce that
, which in particular shows that the process does indeed terminate. Let m denote the time when this happens, i.e., when |F m+1 | < (1−q)n. Let us now set A = m k=1 E k . It is clear that |A| ≥ qn. It remains to show that A ∈ A. Since
Combining this observation with (8) above, we obtain
which completes the proof.
We are now ready to prove Theorem B on improving the democracy constant.
Theorem 10. Let (e i ) be an unconditional and democratic basis of a Banach space X. For any ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm |||·||| on X with respect to which (e i ) is normalized, 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-democratic.
Proof. We can assume that (e i ) is a normalized, 1-unconditional basis. Let ∆ be the democracy constant and ϕ be a fundamental function for (e i ). Given ε > 0, set q = 1 1+ε , fix C > ∆ q(1−q) , and let A be the family given by Lemma 9. Then the following defines a C-equivalent norm on X:
Clearly, (e i ) is still normalized and 1-unconditional in the new norm. We need to verify that it is (1 + ε)-democratic. Fix E ⊂ N and let n = |E|. Taking A ∈ A with A ⊂ E and |A| ≥ q|E|, we obtain
It remains to verify that |||1 E ||| ≤ ϕ(n). On the one hand, by definition, we have 1 E ≤ ϕ(n). On the other hand, for an arbitrary A ∈ A we have
Remark. The upper bound on the equivalence constant on |||·||| given by the proof of Theorem 10 above (which in turn comes from the proof of Lemma 9) is of order 1 ε . In special cases this can be improved. For example, it is not hard to see that in Tsirelson's space we get a constant of order log 1 ε . However, in general, the best constant must converge to infinity as ε goes to zero. Indeed, assume that (e i ) is a greedy basis of X for which there exists a constant C such that for all ε > 0 there is a C-equivalent norm · ε on X with respect to which (e i ) is normalized and (1 + ε)-democratic. Fix a non-trivial ultrafilter U and define |||x||| = lim U x 1 n for x ∈ X. Then |||·||| is a C-equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-democratic. As mentioned in the Introduction, there are greedy bases for which such renorming is not possible.
Theorem 11. Let (e i ) be a greedy basis of a Banach space X with fundamental function ϕ. Assume that δ(ϕ) > 0. Then for all ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is normalized, 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-greedy.
Proof. We can assume that (e i ) is normalized and 1-unconditional. Let ∆ be the democracy constant of (e i ). Given ε > 0, set q = 
We are now ready to define a new norm |||·||| as follows.
It is easy to verify that s x ≤ |||x||| ≤ (s + mbC + Ln 0 ) x for all x ∈ X, and it is clear that (e i ) is a 1-unconditional basis in |||·|||. We next prove that it also satisfies Property (A) with constant 1 + 4ε. Fix x ∈ c 00 with x ≥ 0 and B,B ⊂ N \ supp(x) such that x ℓ∞ ≤ 1 and |B| = |B| < ∞. It is sufficient to prove that |||x + 1 B ||| ≤ (1 + 4ε)|||x + 1B|||.
ψ(|Ai|) |Ai| 1 Bi ∈ F m and A ⊂ N with |A| ≤ n 0 we have
Without loss of generality we may assume that x * ≥ 0. We now estimate some of the terms above. First, we have
On the other hand, we can choose C ⊂B such that C ∈ A and |C| ≥ q|B|. Then g = ψ(|C|) |C| 1 C ∈ F m , and so
Hence, by the choice of s, we have
Next, without loss of generality, we may assume that
Using the fact that
x is decreasing, we then obtain
We now consider two cases. In the first case we assume that |B| = |B| ≤ n 0 . Then by the choice of L we have
ChooseÃ ⊂ N such thatÃ∩supp(x) = A∩supp(x), |Ã∩B| = |A∩B| and |Ã| = |A|. We then deduce that The condition δ(ϕ) > 0 says that the growth of ϕ on intervals of any given fixed size is eventually linear. For example, when ϕ(x) ∼ x or ϕ(x) ∼ x log x , then δ(ϕ) > 0, so Theorem 11 applies. Note also that when ϕ has the URP, then δ(ϕ) = 0. However, in that case the basis is bidemocratic and Theorem 4 can be used. We next give an application of Theorem 11 in two special cases. Note that neither of these bases is bidemocratic, so Theorem 4 cannot be applied.
Corollary 12. For all ε > 0 there is an equivalent norm on dyadic Hardy space H 1 and on Tsirelson's space T such that the Haar system, respectively, the unit vector basis is normalized, 1-unconditional and (1 + ε)-greedy.
Open problems
For bidemocratic bases we were able to achieve the best possible renorming for the democracy constant (Theorem 3). For the greedy constant Theorem 4 gets arbitrarily close, but the following remains open.
Problem 13. Let (e i ) be a bidemocratic basis of a Banach space X. Does there exist an equivalent norm on X with respect to which (e i ) is 1-greedy?
The following special case of interest was raised by Albiac and Wojtaszczyk. Note that this latter condition rules out properties like the URP. So there is still a gap.
